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No. 21044.

In Bank. Nov. 8, 1950.]

WALTER J. BECKER, A'ppellant. v. GRACE C. BECKER,
;
Respondent.
[1] Divorce-Disposition of Oommunity ProPert)'-Effect of Decree.-Where an interlocutory divorce deeree provided that.
on payment by pla"intifi within two years of a specified sU"'t
representing one-half the value of the community property,
defendant execute to plaintiff a conveyance of such property
and this provision was adopted by the final decree and neither
partyappeaJed from such decree, the court had nO power, on
plaintiff's motion in the same action made nine years later, to
modify the terms of the property settlement as set forth in the
interlocutory decree.

c.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County directing sale of community real property.
Stanley N. Barnes, Judge. Reversed.'

1

Charles Mursteinand Noel Edwards for Appellant.

Keslar A Woo~ward and F~ ..Murray Keslar for Respondent. ~
CARTER, J.-on May 12, 1937, an interlocutory dt-cree'/
of divorce was granted defendant cross-complainant wife
the ground of extreme cruelty; the final judgment was enter~J
June 11, 1938. The interlocutory decrt:e of divorce proviileJ
in the fifth paragraph as follows: "That within two years
from the date 01 this interlocutory decree of divorce, crossdefendant (plaintiff) shall pay to cross-complainant, the sum
of Six Hundred Twenty-five and 00/100 Dollars ($625.00),
in cash, said sum representing one-half Ph) the estimatE'd
value of said two and one-half (2112) acres of land community
property of the parties hereto; that on the payment by cross- i
defendant of said sum of $625.00, cross-complainant (defend- .
ant) will execute a good and sufficient instrument of eonveyance to cross-defendant, or to such person or persons as he may
direct to all her right, title and interest in and to said two
and one-half (2112) acres of land; that until such conveyance
is made, cross-defendant shall pay all taxes that may be or
have been assessed or levied against said real estate." (Em-

un"

[1] See 9 Cal.Jur. 762;17 Am.Jur. aM.
KcK. Dil. Beference: [1J DIVorce,' 236.
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phasis added.) Tb,e final decree adopted the provisions of
the interlocutory decree.
Neither of the parties appealed nor made any attempt to
comply with or enforce the terms of the judgment qntll
.J uly 7, 1948 (except as will appear), when cross-defendant
(plaintiff) made a motion in the same (divorce) action "to
direct the defendant to execute a deed and to satisfy money
judgment." Plaintiff alleged that 'on May 26th, 1948, he had
tendered the sum of $625 with interest to the defendant who
refused to accept it and that he was now ready, able and
willing to pay that amount, plus interest, into court. In his
affidavit he states that he had been unable to pay until that
time; that he has expended approximately $1,000 since the
interlocutory decree in filling in, and levelling the property.
In the affidavit of the attorney for the defendant, it is alleged
that plaintiff's failure to pay the money within the two-yt'ar
period had the effect of leaving the ownership of the property in the parties as tenants in common. It appears from
the affidavit of a real estate broker that the plaintiff now has
a buyer for the property who is willing to pay $24,750.
The order appealed from provided that "IT Is HEREBY
ORDERED, AD~ AND DECREED that plaintiff is entitlt'd to
obtain title amd '(sic] sell tJl.e real property hereinaftl'r dl'scribed when he agrees to pay defendant one-half the proceeds of the ,ale after deducting the actual expenses of the
sale, as well as the amount of taxes and improvements paid
and expended by the plaintiff and that transaction should be
handled through an escrow.
.
"IT Is FuRTHER ORDERED, ADJ'ODGED AND DEOBEED that th('
said motion of plaintiff to direct the defendant to execute a
deed and to satisfy money judgment is granted conditionally,
the condition being his acceptance of the foregoing procedure." [Emphasis added.)
[1] Plaintiff appeals, contending that the trial cou..--t was
without jurisdiction to change the terms of the property settlement as set forth in the interlocutory decree which was a conclusive adjudication of the property rights of the parties upon
the expiration of the time for appeal and for relief pursuant
to section 473, Code of Civil Procedure.
Plaintiff maintains that when a judgment has become final,
the judgment debtor has a right under section 675 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, on motion to order the judgment
satisfied of record where it has been paid. He concedes that
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this judgment has not actually been paid, but contends that
a tender was made which worked a discharge of the lien
given as collateral therefor, and that "The tender having been
mane, it is equivalent to the satisfaction of the judgment and
therefore the motion is proper." (As will hereinafter appear,
this section of the Code of Civil Procedure has no application
to the fads before us.)
There are two questions presented by this appeal: (1) The
interpretation of the two-year limitation in the interlocutory
decree; and (2) the procedure to be followed to enforce the
,
property rights of the parties.
This court has said recently (Taylor v. George, 340al.2d
552, 557 [212 P.2d 505]) that" 'An interlocutory judgment
of divorce is, therefore, so far as it determines the rights of
the parties, a contract between them' " (quoting from Lcmcltm
G. ~ A. 00. v. Industrial Ace. Oom., 181 Cal. 460,465 [184
P. 864]). (See, also, Jones v. Union Oil 00.,218 Cal. 775 [25
P.2d 5] ; M,,"ller v. Murphy, 186 Cal. 344 [199 P. 525] ; Weaver
v. San Francisco, 146 Cal. 728 [81 P. 119].) The interpretation of such a decree is a question of law. (Union Oil 00. v.
Union Sugar 00., 31 Cal.2d 800 [188 P.2d470]; Western
Coal ~Mining Oo.v. Jones, 27 Cal.2d 819 [167 P.2d 7l~''
164 A.L.R. 685]; Estate of Platt,21Ca1.2d 343 f131"}5~825) ; Estate of Pearson, 90 Cal.App.2d 436 (203 P.2d 52]; "
Estate of Norris, 78 Cal.App.2d 152 [177 P.2d 299].)
If we consider the interlocutory decree as a contract, it I
would appear that by its terms the parties obtained mut\1n) '\
rights and were under mutual obligations-one to pay a cer·
tain sum in return for which the other was to convey a certain
one-half interest m real property. These promises were
mutually concurrent and were, by the' terms of the decree,
to be performed within two years from the date of the decree.
The terms of the decree should have bt:.-en complied with
during 'the two-year period, but were not. Likening it to a
contract in which we assume that time was not of the essence,
performance should have been within a reasonable time there- 1
after. Section 276 of the Restatement of Contracts provides A,i
that" In determining the materiality of delay in performance,
the following rules are applicable: (d) In contracts for the ;
sale or purchase of land delay of one party must be greater
in order to discharge the duty of the other than in mercantile
contracts. (e) In a suit for specific performance of a contract
for the sale or purchase of laTHl. considerable delay in tendering performance does not prl!c1ude enforcement of the contrae·t
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where the delay can be compensated for by interest on the
purchase money or otherwise, unless (i) the contract expressly
states that performance at or within a given time is essential,
or (ii) the nature of the contract, in view of the accompanyingcircumstances, is such that enforcement will work injustice. "Section 1492 of the Civil Code is substantially the
same as subdivision e(i) ·of the Restatement. That section
. provides that "Where delay in performance is capable of
exact and entire compensation, and time has not been expressly
(leclared to be of the essence of the obligation. an offer of
performance, accompanied with an offer of such compensation,
may be made at any time after it is due, but Witllout prejudice to any rights acquired by the creditor, or by any other
person, in the meantime." By his motion, plaintiff is, in
effect, seeking specific performance of a contract which should
have been performed within a reasonable time after the
expiration of the two-year limitation. It would seem that,
as a matter of law, it can be said that a nine-year delay is
not a reasonable time. Section 3392 'of the Civil Code provides that "Specific performance cannot be· enforced in favor
of a party who has not fully and fairly pt'rformed all the
cOl1ditionspr~dent -on .his ..part -to-thL.gll.ligl!!io..!!_J)!. the_
.other party, except where his failure to perform is only
partial, and either entirely immaterial, or capable of being
specific performance may
fully compensated, in whichbe compelled, upon full compensation being made for the
default. " Even where timt' is not of the essence, courts will
not allow specific performanCt' after delay in tender, if enforcement will work injustice, or whert' delay is inexcusable.
(Cockn'll v. Boas, 213 Cal. 490 [2 P.2d7741; Mathews v.
Davis, 102 Cal. 202 [36 P. 358] ; Boulenger v. Morison, 88
Cal.App. 664 [264 P. 256].) It would seem that if plaintitI
had been able, as he was, to expend $1,000 on improving the
property, his plea of incapacity to comply with the decree
is not too meritorious. And it would also appear that to
enforce the original provisions as to payment will work a
great injustice on defendant.
It appears that the decree gave the parties a two-year
period and a reasonable time thereafter to comply with its
terms and that when that time exp.ired they would each hold
an undivided one-half interest in the property as tenants
in common. Tn other words, the result is thp same as it would
be had no final disposition of the community property been
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made in either the interlocutory or final divorce decrees. (6
Cal.Jur.360.)
_
This court has held many times that a divorce decree which
adjudicates the property rights of the parties is not subject
to modification regardless of whether or not it is based on
agreement of the parties. (Codornu v. Codorniz, 34 Cal.2d :J
811 [215 P.2d 32] ; Leupe v. Leupe,21 Cal.2d 145 [130 P.2d .~
697 J ; Adams v. Adams, 29 Cal.2d 621 [177 P.2d 265] ; Dupon"~
v. Dupont, 4 Ca1.2d 227 [48 P.2d 677] ; Ettlinger v. EttUnge"~
3 Ca1.2d 172 [44 P.2d 540J.) It would appear, as a result,-ii
that had this motion been made at the end of the two-year
period, or within a reasonable time thereafter, the trial court
should have granted the motion by making an order compelling defendant to convey her interest in the property upon
payment of $625 as provided in the interlocutory decree. Sueh
a motion was not made, however, and the provisions of the
interlocutory decree purporting to make a division of the _"
community property of the parties is now of no force and
effect. The result is the same as if no disposition of such
community property had been made, and the parties now
hold title to the property as tenants in common. (Buller v.
Buller, 62 Cal.App.2d 694 [145 P.2d 653] ; Lorraine v. Lorraine, 8 Cal.App.2d 687 [48 P.2d 48] ; Fieger v. Fieger, 2if
Cal.App.2d 736 [83 P.2d 526].) It was, therefore, improper
for the trial court to make an order in the same (divorce)
action modifying the terms of the property settlement contained in the interlocutory decree and which was incorporated
by reference in the final decree of divorce. When the community interests are not determined in the interlocutory or
final decree, the spouses must prove, in a separate action, the
property to which they are entitled. (Green v. Green, 66
Cal.App.2d 50, 57 [151 P.2d 679J; Lorrai~ v. Lorraine,
IUpra; Brown v. Brown, 170 Cal. 1 [147 P. 1168J.)
Par the foregoing reasons the order appealed from is
reversed.
Gibson, C. J., and Shenk, J., concurred.
TRAYNOR, J., Concurring.-A judgment is not less a
judgment when it is likened to a contract for certain purposes
(Jones v. Union Oil Co., 218 Cal. 775, 778 [25 P.2d 5];
London G. & A. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., 181 Cal. 460.
465-466 [184 P. 864] ; 1 Freeman, Judgments, § 6, pp. 10-11),
or included within the meaning of the term "Contract" in
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certain statutes (Taylor v. George, 34 Ca1.2d 552, 557 [212
P.2d 505] ; Maler v. Murphy, 186 Cal. 344.347 [199 P. 525]).
Its interpretation, effect, and enforcement are stilI subject
to the rules of law governing judgments. Thus an action on
a judgment is governed by the statute of limitations relating·
to judgments (Code Civ. Proe., § 336(1)), and not by those
relating to contracts (Oode Civ. Proe., §§ 337[11.83911];
al'e, also, Dore v. Thornburgh, 90 Cal. 64, 66 {27 P. 30, 25
Am.St.Rep. 100]; 1 Freeman, Judgments, §§ 5-6, pp. 7-]3).
Sections 681 to 713% of the Code of Civil Procedure govern·
ing the enforcement of judgments govern the enforeemPllt
of. the interlocutory decree in the present case. They C&nU()1
be supplanted by principles at variance therewith based on all
.
analogy between contracts and judgments.
The decree in the present ease ordered that "within tW(I
years from the date of this interlocutory decree of divorc('
I plaintiff] shall pay to [defendant], the sum of Six H undrt'c1
Twenty Five and 00/100 Dollars . . . that on the payment
by [plaintiff] of said sum of $625, [defendant] will execute i
a good and sufficient instrument of conveyance to [plaintiff) ;
. . . to all her right, title and interest in and to said . . .
land. Jt The decree did not make a presently effective disposition of the community prope:tty (cl., Wilson v. WilBon, 76
Cal.App.2d 119, 130 [172 P.2d 568]), or effect any transfer
of the legal title thereto. It merely ordered the parties to
.perform certain acts upon performance of which plaintiff
would become the sole owner of the real property in question.
Like a conditional decree for specific performance of a eontract for the sale of real property (see Epstein v. G~, 233
N.Y. 490, 494 [135 N.E. 861]), the interlocutory decree merely
created reciprocal rights and obligations in both parties
enforceable by either on a tender of the performance due
from him under the terms of the decree. The enforcement of
the decree as a judgment of a court of competent jurisdietiolJ
is governed by the provisions of sections 681 and 685 of th(·
Code of Civil Procedure.
Execution on a judgment will issue as a matter of right fol'
a period of five years from the date of entry. (Dt CorI'O v.
Di Corpo, 83 Cal.2d 195, 201 [200 P.2d 529] ; Wolle v. Wolfe.
30 Cal.2d 1, 4 [180 P.2d 345] ; Code Civ. Proc., § 681.) Tbl'
decree in the present case in effect postponed enfoTcement
thercof by defendant for two Yl'llrs: b~·. not appealing froDl
the decree, aheagreed to that pOl:ltponement. (London G. ct
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A. Co. v. Industrial Acc~ Com., supra.) When enforcement of
a judgment is postponed for a specified period, the time dur..;",

)

ing which it is postponed "must be excluded from the com- ';
putation of the five years within which execution may issue. 't;
(Code Civ. Proc., § 681:) Defendant was therefore entitled
: to enforce the judgment at any time within five years after
performance by plaintiff became due, or a maximum of
seven years after entry of the decree. Enforcement by plain- ,
tiff, however, was not postponed; he could compe] the execu_-c
tion of a deed by deferidant at any time after entry of the.
decree upon tender of $625. Section 681 therefore limits
enforcement by plaintiff as a matter of right to a period of
five years after entry of the decree. The majority opinion,
however, holds by analogy to contract law that the judgment
may be enforced only for two years "plus a reasonable time"
thereafter. What is a reasonable time will depend on the
circumstances of each case. It may be less than five years
after performance becomes due. The rule of the majority ,
opinion is directly in conflict with the statutory provision,
that the judgment is enforceable as a matter of right for a
period of five years from the date of its entry, excluding any
time during which enforcement is stayed or postponed by
order of the court'- 'The' iitterrule -mustgovern--;--shl.ce it is
the rule controlling the enforcement of judgments.
';;'
When more than five years have elapsed from the date 0
entry of judgment, subject to the exclusion of any time during which execution is postponed, issuance of a writ of execution is not a matter of right, but a matter within the sound
discretion of the trial court. The writ may then issue "by
leave of the ,court, upon motion . . . accompanied by an
affidavit or affidavits setting forth the reasons for failure to
proceed in compliance with the provisions of section 681 of
this code. The failure to set forth such reasons as shall, in
the discretion of the court, be sufficient, shall be ground for
the denial of the motion." (Code Civ. Proc., § 685.) Plaintiff ._. . ;
did not seek to enforce the judgment until more than 11 years
had elapsed since the date of entry thereof. The trial court ,
found that his failure to seek execution at an earlier date i
was not justified and denied his motion. The evidence set
forth in the majority opinion demonstrates that the denial
of the motion was not an abuse of the court'8 discretion under
section 685. (Di Corpo v. Di Corpo, supra, 200; Willia"",
v. Goodin, 17 Cal.App.2d 62, 64-65 [61 P.2d 507]; Wheeler
v. Eldred, 121 Cal. 28, 29, 30 [53 P. 431, 66 Am.St.Rep. 20] J
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Badonich v. Badonich, 130'Cal.App. 250, 254 [20 P.2d 51].)
The trial court must, ona motion under section 685, issue.
or deny the writ of execution. It has no power to modify the
judgment. (Parker v. Parker, 203 Cal. 787, 795 [266 P. 283];
WeZdon v. Rogers, 154 Cal. 632,634-635 [98 P.1070].) The
interlocutory decree was not appealed and it has long since
become final. Trial courts cannot modify or amend their
judgments except as prescribed by statute (Bowman v. Bowman, 29- Cal.2d 808, 814 [178 P.2d 751, 170 A.L.R. 246]) and
there is no statutory authority for the modification of the
decree in the present caSe. (Bowman v. Bowman, supra;
Estate of Burnett, 11 Cal.2d 259, 262 [79 P.2d 89] ; BarllltD
v. Oity Oouncil of Inglewood, 32 Cal.2d 688, 692-693 [197
P.2d 721J ; Lankton v. Superior Oourt, 5 Cal.2d 694, 698 [55
P.2d 1170]; 2 McBaine, California Trial & Appellate Practice, §§ 872-874, pp. 204-214; see, also, Leupe v. Leupe, 21
Cal.2d 145.148 [130 P.2d 697}.)
There is no question of the power of the court in the interlocutory decree to make a presently effective disposition of
the community property. as in Leupe v Leupe, 21 Ca1.2d
145 [130 P.2d 697}, in which the trial court presently awarded
the husband certain pe~nal property, 8llbject to a lien
thereon to secure payments to the Wife for her interest therein.
In such a case, the decree of its own force and effect disposes
of the community property and transfers the title thereto.
(0/., Wilson V" Wilson,76 Cal.App.2d 119, 130, 133 [172 P.2d
568].) In the present case, however, the trial court did Dot
purport to make a presently effective disposition of the community property. Tit1e thereto could not be altered ortran8ferred without the performance of additional acts by the
parties, viz., the payment of $625 by plaintiff to defendant
and the execution of a deed by defendant to plaintiff. The
situation with respect to that property therefore is governed
by the rules applicable to the disposition of community property when the decree makes no provision therefor. The marriage was Dot dissolved by the interlocutory decree and no
present disposition of the community property was made
therein, so that it remained community property until the
entry of the final decree. {Pereira v. Pereira, 156 Cal. 1, 10
(103 P. 488, 134 Am.St.Rep. 107, 23 L.R.A.N.S. 880].) If
neither the final· nor the interlocutory decree mentions the
community property, or if thp trial (,Ollrt finds that certain
property is community propOl"ty but wakes no present dis-

,.)

\

I

I
{

•

i
I

i

332

[aG 0.24'

position thereof, the parties upon the entry of the final decree;
become tenants in common of that property. (Tarien v. Kat.,'
216 Oal. 554, 559 [15 P.2d 493, 85 A.L.R. 334]; Buller 'f.
Buller, 62 Oal.App.2d 694, 698 [145 P.2d 653]; Fieger v.;
Fieger, 28 Oal.App.2d 736, 738 [83 P.2d 526].) In the present'
case, therefore, plaintiff and defendant at the time of thE' entr,
of the final decree became tenants in common of the real J"
property in question, since no present disposition thereof,
was made. Defendant held title to her nndivided half inter~'
est subject to her duty ullder the decree to convey that inter,.,
est to plaintiff upon his payment of $625 to her. Until that .
conveyance was made, hOwever, legal title rested in both parties as tenants in common. Its transfer was not effected by a
decree directing that certain acts be done that would effect
its transfer. Since the trial court in the exercise of a sound
discretion determined that the decree could not be enforced
on plaintiff's motion therefor, the respective interests ot,
the parties in the real property may not be determined with
reference to the divorce decree but must be adjudicated in ':
all independent action brought for that purpose. (Tarien v.1
Katz, supra; Buller v. Buller, supra; Brown v. Brown, 170,,1
Cal. I, 3 [147 P. 1168]; Lorr:S'ine v. Lorraine, 8 Oal.App.2d i
i>87,698 [48 P.2d 48] pflstateO]BriX,-ls-:1C'aT667:'676 [186;
P. 135] ; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Welch, 202 Cal. 312, 318'i
[260 P. 5 4 5 ] . ) - .. -. __ '-I therefore concur in the judgment of reversal.
Edmonds, J., concurred.
SCHAUER, J.-I concur in the judgment of reversal.
I think that the decree, properly construed, finally disposed
of all community property. Among other things, it awarded
$625 to defendant. This award was unconditional but plaintiff
was expressly allowed two years within which to make the
payment, before defendant could have execution to collect it.
Subject to making such paYlr',ent, and otherwise equally
unconditionally, the property in question was awarded to
plaintiff. There was no alternative for either the award of
the money or the award of the property. All community interests and rights of the parties were completely determined
by this judgment.
The effect of the provisions of the judgment is that the
property was awarded to plaintiff but subjected to a lien to
secure payment of the sum awarded defendant. The judg-
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ment did ftotdeclare that time was of the essence of any of
its provisions or that any rights therein created or determined were to be divested by lapse of time or any other
occurrence. The two-year period was, in a sense, a stay of
execution; at any time after the two years and within five
years thereafter defendant could have had execution issue
as of course. Likewise, either within the two years or within
five years thereafter, plainti1f could, as of course, have paid
the $625 with legal interest and have had the property cleared
of the lien.
It seems to me to be llllSound law and undesirable policy
to require, as do a concurring majority, that the parties
engage in new and independent litigation to resettle their
property rights. Those rights have been once fully determined and the judgment making such determination has
become final. If new litigation such as the majority suggest
had been instituted within five years from entry of the judgment would not a plea of res judicata have been unanswerableT If the rights were res judicata then, by what process
have they since become not res judicata T The parties have
suggested and research has disclosed no prior case in California wherein, after full determination of community property rights in a judgment 'Of divorce which has become final,
this court has ordered the parties to relitigate their rights in
an independent action.
I think that the judgment, long since final, cannot now be
modified either in respect to its effect on the status of the
parties or its allocation of property rights. The only question, as I see it, is one relating to enforcement. Can it now
be enforced by plainti1f f In view of the fact that defendant
at any time after the two-year stay and within five years thereafter could have had, as of course, and thereafter upon a
reasonable showing, execution to enforce the judgment, and
failed to ask its enforcement, I fail to see how she is prejudiced by the delay of plainti1f in making a tender of full performance on his part. Having security for eventual payment
it is conceivable that she may have preferred to keep the $625
accumulating interest at the l~gal rate of 7 per cent per annum.
There is no contention that she has not accepted other provisions of the judgment which went to her benefit. Under the
circumstances I think that not only did the trial court have
power to enforce the judgment, but that its failure to do so
constitutes an abuse of judicial discretion.
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For the r~ons above stated I concur in the judgment of

n;:~J. eon.....a

Appellant's petition for a rehE'aringwM denied December
'I, 1950. Schauer, J.,and Spence,J., voted for a rehearing.
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